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Introduction
The European Union has succeeded in creating a common market even if some obstacles to the free flow of goods, services, capital and labour still remain. For a brief history and analysis of the Single Market and for a follow-up on subsequent measures taken to complete the Single Market, see Flam (1992) and Flam (2015) . As shown in Flam (2015) , there exists surprisingly little research on the amount of economic integration achieved by the Single Market. In this paper, we use tools from the global value chain (GVC) 1 , spatial networks 2 and income convergence 3 literatures to provide a description of the anatomy of integration in the European Union and how integration has changed and intensified over time and as additional countries have joined the Union. The questions we ask are: Are all countries equally integrated? What is the pattern of specialization across countries? What countries serve as hubs or nodes in the European production network? What changes can be observed over time? And -as an indicator of the success of integration -have incomes converged across countries as a result of integration?
Trade associated with production networks in the European Union-so-called supply-chain trademakes up roughly two-thirds of trade in the Single Market. 4 Such trade will continue to increase as man-made trade barriers and transportation and communication costs continue to fall. The European Union is a recurrent object of study in the GVC literature. For example , Timmer et.al. (2013) use GVC tools to analyse production fragmentation in the European Union, and Leitner and Stehrer (2014) links the economic performance of new member states to the participation in global value chains. As far as the network literature is concerned, we cannot find any studies that focus specifically on the European Union. However, there is a growing number of network papers that use input-output datasets to analyse the structure of the global trade network, many of which point to the European Union as a regional hub in the global economy. 5 The network paper that is most similar to ours is Lejour et.al. (2017) , which proposes a new method for identifying hubs in a production network by looking at the value-added content of the output vector of the last processing country before final demand.
The contribution of our paper is both methodological and substantive. One methodological contribution is the combination of network and GVC tools, including a value-chain based definition of hubs in the input-output system. Our index is similar to the index of Lejour et.al. (2017) . 6 In addition,
we offer a new value-chain definition of the density of the input-output system, which in the at network literature is defined as the share of potential links that exist. Adapted to a value chain context, we define the density as the share of intermediate exports of value added that is supplied directly to the ultimate user (as opposed to via a hub in the system). The third methodological contribution is our use of forward and backward integration indices to study whether supply-chain trade facilitates the convergence of wages at the sector level in the European Union. Our analysis builds on the research of Leitner and Stehrer (2014) , who established a positive link between the economic performance of the new member states (in terms of exports, employment and productivity growth) and participation in global value chains (measured as the foreign value-added content of exports).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we construct a graph of the inputoutput structure of the production network in the European Union. Section 3 gives a short description of the World Input Output Database (WIOD) that underlies our study. Section 4 presents empirical results on the specialization pattern and backward and forward integration of the member states into supply chains in the European production network, plus results on how supply chains relate to economic size and years of membership. Section 5 takes a network perspective and shows that Germany is the central hub in the European production system, with France, Italy and the United Kingdom as important but lesser hubs. The analysis also shows that the network has become denser -has more direct supply links between the member states -and has moved eastward over time as new member states have become more integrated. Section 6 finds that supply-chain trade causes convergence of wages at the sector level across countries. Section 7 concludes.
6 Our measure is a GVC adaptation of the so-called betweenness centrality index used in the network literature. The derivation is different from Lejour et.al. (2017) but the indices are similar.
A first look at European Union integration
Let us first look at in Figure 1 which is a map of the European Union production network. The inputoutput data used to construct the map are taken from the November 2016 edition of the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) described in section 3. Arrows show gross flows of primary (green), manufactured (blue) and services inputs (red) between the member states in 2014. For clarity we only include bilateral trade worth more than 100 million USD. (The WIOD database is denominated in USD). Arrows between member states are colour coded and divided into 100 steps using a logarithmic scale. More intense colours signify larger trade flows. Figure 1 . Gross flows of primary, manufactured and services inputs in 2014 between EU countries worth more than 100 million USD As one may expect, trade in intermediate inputs in absolute terms is most intensive between the largest economies in the European Union and Germany is the central hub in the production network. The supply-chain trade is particularly intensive in the triangle formed by Germany, France, and the Benelux countries, all of which are original members of the EU. Colours show the basic pattern of specialization. The old member states trade relatively more services and the new member states relatively more primary and manufactured inputs, with the exception of Cyprus and Malta that specialize in services.
Data
Our data are from the November 2016 edition of WIOD, which was put together by a research group coordinated by members of the Economics and Business faculty of University of Groningen, Netherlands. WIOD is constructed from national IO-tables and bilateral trade data and covers all current member states and 15 key trading partners to the European Union listed in Table 1 
The pattern of trade in intermediate inputs
As a preliminary step, we need to describe the structure of a closed economy input-output model and then of the multi-country input-output model of WIOD.
Closed economy input-output model
The input-output table of a closed economy is depicted in Table 3 . The first n n elements of the input-output table record intra-and inter-industry flows of intermediate goods and services, where sales from sector i to j are recorded horizontally and purchases by sector j from sector i vertically. The n+1 column ("Final demand") records sales to final consumers and the n+1 row ("Value added") outlays on labour and capital used to process intermediate inputs into next-stage ("downstream") inputs in the value-chain. The right-most column reports total output (supply) by industry and the bottom row total input (use) by industry, which in equilibrium are equal in monetary terms. Supplying sector Sector 2 z21 z22
The production side of this Leontief model is the simplest possible, with fixed input coefficients and constant returns to scale (CRS),
(1) = min , , … , ; , where denotes the output of sector i, inputs from sector j and inputs of primary production factors (which in equilibrium equals 1− ∑ under the CRS assumption). As there is no substitutability between different types of inputs in the Leontief model, firms will employ just the minimum amount of inputs to produce the output demanded by the market,
The model is closed by treating final demand as an exogenous vector. Under these assumptions, the model boils down to a linear equation system of supply and demand,
where denotes the production vector, the input-output matrix per unit of output and the final demand vector. The equation system has the following solution (general equilibrium),
where [ − ] is the so-called Leontief inverse that computes total input requirement from each sector to produce the final demand vector.
Multi-country input-output model
Extending the Leontief model into a multi-country input-output model is a matter of scaling up the model, since the world as a whole is a closed economy. Using block-matrix notation, the multicountry version of the Leontief model takes the form
where is the output vector of country i; is the input-output block between country i and j; and ∑ is the global demand vector for the final products of country i. The dashed lines in (5) mark the division between the European Union and the rest of the world.
The global input-output model can be expressed in compact form as a two-region model with the European Union as one region (subscript ) and the rest of the world as the other region (subscript ),
where records input-output linkages within the European Union, forward (downstream) linkages to the rest of the world, and backward (upstream) linkages to the rest of the world. The general equilibrium of the world economy can be solved as a function of the four blocks of through block inversion,
where
measure the circular flows of inputs between the regions (known as "returning value added" in the GVC literature). The upper left block of the global Leontief inverse measures the supply-chain trade within the European Union (including returning inputs that re-enter the supply chains after a processing stage outside the European Union), the upper right block the sales of inputs to the rest of the world and the lower left block the purchases of inputs.
Supply-chain decomposition
To analyse the supply chains we need additional tools that can split them into their country components, or specifically, to split total value added into country contributions. In this context we may call supply chains value added chains (the two concepts are used interchangeably in the literature). The decomposition of value added can either be done by following the value chains forward (downstream) from each sector to the final demand vector, or backward (upstream) from each sector to the different tiers of suppliers and sub-suppliers. We will use the backward decomposition technique, as illustrated in Figure 3 .
The backward decomposition technique introduced by Mirodout and Nordström (2015) starts with the accounting identity
where is a unit vector of output, is the cost share of non-primary inputs (using primes to denote the transpose of matrix or vector) and the value-added share, i.e. the compensation received by the primary factors of production, labour and capital, per unit of output. By iterating the accounting identity backward in the supply chain (that is, replacing the on the right hand side with + ) we get an infinite series that decomposes the value-added by stage of production: 
The share of an individual country is found by setting all coefficients to zero in the -vector except for the country under consideration. These calculations can be done for one country at the time or in one computational step by redefining as a block-diagonal matrix,
.
The -matrix provides a full decomposition of the contribution of each country (c = 1, 2, …, m) per unit of output in all value chains defined by the database, where the domestic shares (divided between final assembly and upstream production) are recorded on the diagonal blocks and the foreign shares by country on the off-diagonal blocks. The decomposition can be done by country and sector by simply exchanging the block-diagonal matrix of for a diagonal matrix, thereby expanding that dimension of from (country × sector) × country to (country × sector) × (country × sector).
Slicing the value chain
How much of the value added in the output of the European Union can be attributed to domestic inputs of the member states (referred to as domestic value added); how much can be attributed to inputs produced in other member states (referred to as EU value added); and how much can be attributed to inputs produced outside the European Union (referred to as non-EU value added)? We are interested both in the differences between primary production, manufacturing and services (Table 1) and the evolution over time. As one may expect, manufacturing uses more imported inputs from EU and non-EU countries than the primary sector, which in turn uses more imported inputs than the services sector. The manufacturing sector is by this measure more integrated into regional and global value chains than the other sectors. The division between EU and non-EU inputs is roughly fifty-fifty in all sectors, measured in value added. The imported share of value added is increasing over time and somewhat faster for non-EU inputs than EU inputs. Thus, there is no evidence that the European Union is closing its gates towards the outside world. Now, since the shares of both EU and non-EU inputs have increased over time, the domestic valueadded shares must have fallen, albeit from a high level. The domestic share in primary production has fallen from 85.9 percent in 2000 to 79.2 percent in 2014; in manufacturing from 73.6 percent to 64.8 percent; and in services from 89.6 percent to 86.9 percent. Is that bad news? Presumably, this has contributed to lower costs and/or increased quality.
Degrees of backward and forward integration
Are all member states equally integrated in the supply chains in the European Union? To answer this question, we need metrics of integration. It may be helpful to recall Figure 1 at this point, which maps the flows of intermediate inputs between the member states. Arrows that point to a country indicate purchases of inputs and arrows that point from a country indicate sales of inputs. We refer to the former as backward and the latter as forward integration. The backward integration is calculated by summing the upstream value added over all member states in equation (10), apart from the domestic blocks on the diagonal. The forward integration can also be calculated in a roundabout way using equation (10). For example, to calculate the forward integration of Sweden, we could use equation (10) states use in their production. However, we will derive a direct metric by following the supply chains forward through the input-output system to the final demand vector and measure how much value added that is routed from each member state through each of the other member states. This metric will also be used in section 5 to identify hubs in the input-output system.
We first ask how much value added that is exported via each individual member state j = {1,2, …, 28} and then sum the results. To isolate the production stages in country j we use an ancillary matrix with zero coefficients in all positions of but for the columns of j, denoted . The value added exported through country j to the world market (as inputs in country j´s export of final products) is given by the following formula,
where is the value added vector and where the operator · denotes the Hadamard product (element-by-element multiplication). Note that (11) accounts for all paths in the global input-output system that passes through country j either directly or indirectly after processing in other countries, including countries outside the EU. Summing over all member states except for the exporting country we get a measure of the forward integration within the European Union, normalized with the GDP (total value added) of the exporting country. Since the forward integration index measures the share of the national value added that is embodied as inputs in the output vector of the other member states, it is the mirror image of the backward integration index that measures the value added of the other member states embodied in the national output vector. Forward integration in 2014 Figure 6 plots the backward and forward integration with the rest of the world. The correlation with the size of the economy is also in this case negative backwards and forwards in the supply chains. The general conclusion is that small economies tend to be more integrated as a share of GDP into both EU and non-EU value chains compared to large economies. This is natural since small countries cannot produce as many inputs as large countries without forgoing economies of scale in production. Furthermore, supply-chain trade may be particularly advantageous for small economies since it offers an opportunity to trade indirectly with the world through centrally located hubs (see Section 5). Yearly fixed effects are included to control for business cycle and trends in the data. *, **, *** indicate the significance level of the estimated countries (10%, 5% and 1%).
Apart from economic size, integration in the European Union also depends on how long a country has been a member. This is shown in Table 4 . The integration impact of becoming a member of the EU is measured by a dummy variable that is zero in the years before accession and one after the accession plus the number years a country has been a member, a continuous variable. The estimated coefficients show that backward and forward integration is on average 3.28 and 3.33 percentage points higher respectively for European Union members than for the candidate member countries in any given year, and that backward and forward integration into the supply chains increases by 0.15 and 0.08 percentage points annually after accession to the European Union.
For completeness, we also run regressions on the integration into non-EU value chains. We are particularly interested in whether accession to the European Union reduces integration into non-EU value chains. As shown in the last two columns of Table 4 , there is no evidence of a substitution effect. On the contrary, the relationship seems to be complementary. That is, acceding countries do not only increase their integration in EU value chains over time but also in non-EU value chains. This somewhat surprising result can be explained by the benefits offered by access to the European Union´s network of free trade agreements, productivity improvements (see section 6), and indirect exports of inputs to the world market through well-connected hubs in the EU (see section 5).
Division of labour in the European Union
We close this section by analysing the division of labour in the European Union. For reasons of space limitation, we divide the 56 sectors in WIOD into 8 groups of inputs defined in Table 2 : Primary products; Resource-based manufactured inputs; Computer and electronic equipment; Machinery, vehicles, transport equipment and other manufactured inputs; Transportation services; Finance and insurance; Business services; and Other services. The specialization pattern is evaluated by comparing supply shares of each member state with weighted averages of all member states (marked by the zero lines in Figure 7 ). The first plot in Figure 7 shows that Denmark, Bulgaria, Netherlands, Latvia and Croatia are relatively large suppliers of primary inputs in relative -not absolute -terms. 
The geography of the European Union production network
Network analysis -so-called graph theory in mathematics -is used in many academic disciplines to visualize and analyse systems composed of individual parts that are linked together in some way.
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When the object is a social network -such as a Facebook group or an academic network -the adjective social is used to indicate both the nature of the network and the tools that are used, many of which were developed in sociology. Central in social network analysis is the "position" and "centrality" of individual members (countries in our case) and the advantage or disadvantage of a given position.
First, we are interested in the existence of hubs in the production network. To identify hubs we construct an index by calculating how much value added that is exported through country from each member state, using formula (11), and dividing the result by the country´s total exports of intermediate inputs multiplied by 100. The pass-through or hub index ranges from 0 to 100 percent, where the upper limit indicates that all exports of intermediate inputs are inputs that pass through the hubs with no direct trade in intermediate inputs between the countries concerned. The maximum index value that we observe in the data is 27.6 percent (from the Czech Republic through Germany). The pass-through index is related to the so-called betweenness centrality index used in the network literature, which measures the importance of individual nodes as so-called bridges to other nodes in the system. 11 Our hub index is similar to the hub index derived independently by Lejour et.al. (2017) .
The threshold for being a hub is a matter of judgment. It depends both on the index value and on the absolute value of traded inputs. For the latter criterion to be fulfilled, a relatively large number of significant trade flows from other countries must pass through the country that is a hub. If we compare the maps for 2000 and 2014 it seems at first sight that Germany has strengthened its hub position in the network. But the map is somewhat misleading, since it only includes trade flows above the 5 percent threshold. All hubs have in fact lost some ground, including Germany, as is evident from Table 6 . The losses have mainly been to countries outside the European Union and to China in particular. For example, the share of all intermediate value-added exports in the European Union passing through Germany (not counting domestic value added) has fallen from 10.3 percent in in 2000 to 9.4 percent in 2014, whereas it has increased for Poland from 1.4 to 1.9 per cent. For the European Union as a whole, the vale added that passes through all hubs has decreased from 53. The next feature of the European production network that we are interested in is whether it has become "denser" over time. The literature defines density as the fraction of potential links that are present in a network. 12 Adapted to the input-output context, we define density as the share of intermediate exports of value added that is supplied directly to the ultimate user,
weighted over all member states. (The other part is supplied through the hubs in the global inputoutput system). Results are plotted in Figure 9 , which shows that density has increased from 55.9 to 62.8 percent between 2000 and 2014. In other words, the direct supply of inputs between the member states has, on average, increased from 55.9 to 62.8 percent over this period, whereas the indirect supply through hubs (including outside hubs) has decreased from 44.1 to 37.2 percent. The production network has in this sense become denser between 2000 and 2014, with more direct supply links between the member states. 
Wage convergence between member states
In the final section of the paper we will test whether wages are converging at the sector level, and whether the rate of convergence increases with backward and forward integration of the member states into the European production network (as well as into global value chains). Our hypothesis is that trade in inputs facilitates the diffusion of technology, allowing lagging countries to catch up with leading countries. This idea is central in the GVC literature. Humphrey and Schmitz (2000) argue, based on empirical research, that local producers learn a great deal from outside buyers about how to improve the production processes, attain consistent and high quality, and increase the speed of response to changes in demand conditions. Piermartini and Rubínová (2014) argue that supply-chain trade is particularly conducive to knowledge diffusion compared to trade in final products since buyers of inputs need to ensure the quality and compatibility of all parts and components. An example is provided by Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez (2015) : "When Toyota makes car parts in Thailand, they do not rely on local know-how; they bring Toyota technology, Toyota management, Toyota logistics and any other bits of know-how needed since the Thai-made parts have to fit seamlessly into the company's production network".
The wage rate is calculated from the Social Economic Accounts annexed to WIOD, 14 which include data on the total labour compensation and hours of work for each sector and country in the database. We adopt the -convergence model of Baumol (1986) , Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) , Mankiw et.al. (1992) and, with applications to international trade, Ben-David (1993) . The model is based on the transition dynamics of the neoclassical growth model of Solow (1956) , which predicts convergence in per capita income among countries that share the same basic conditions for growth.
Countries that are very different from each other may not converge because of persistent differences in the returns to investment (in favour of the country with better institutions and policies for growth). The Solow model is an aggregate model, but the same kind of transition dynamics can be expected at the sector level in an economic union where capital, labour and technology can flow freely.
Let us first plot the data to see if we can detect any -convergence. All sectors in WIOD are included except for public, local and household services (heading O to U of ISIC, Rev 4). 15 The latter are dropped since they are either non-market activities or are oriented to the local market. We use a scatter plot with the initial hourly wage rates in 2000 on the horizontal axis, using a logarithmic scale as in the theoretical model, and the percentage change between 2000 and 2014 on the vertical axis. The result is plotted in Figure 10 . Fifteen outliers with more than 1 000 percent change in the wage rate (from extremely low initial wages of less than 0.5 USD per hour) have been excluded.
The scatter plot suggests that wages are indeed converging as countries with lower initial wages tend to have higher wage increases. The dotted line in the plot shows the log-linear trend, but the actual relationship seems to be non-linear (which is the actual shape of the transition path in the Solow model) with proportionally faster wage growth for countries with relatively low initial wages.
Let us next test if what we see can be confirmed by regressions. We specify the regression model in the classical way pioneered by Baumol (1986) , Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) , ⁄ is the wage increase between period t-1 and t, , is the logarithm of the wage rate in period t-1, , a vector of control variables, and an error term (assumed to be independent and identically distributed). The control vector , includes the forward and backward integration indices derived in Section 4 plus the size of the economy measured by ln( ). The latter is included to control for the negative correlation observed between the size of the economy and the integration into regional and global value chains. All sectors are included in the regressions except public, local and household services in section O-U of ISIC Rev 4. To control for systematic differences across sectors, we adopt a fixed effect model by sector-and-year, with a total of 700 panels (50 sectors times 14 years). The regression results are presented in Table 8 . The negative sign on the -coefficient (the coefficient on the logarithm of the lagged wage rate) suggests that wages at the sector level are converging over time in the sense that member states with lower initial wages tend to enjoy faster wage growth rates. The forward and backward integration indices introduced in specification (2) to (5) are positive, but not always individually significant. The EU integration indices are both significant when they are entered alone in specification (2); as are the non-EU indices when they are entered alone in specification (3). However, when both EU and non-EU indices are included in specification (4), Backward EU and Forward non-EU are significant but not Forward EU and Backward non-EU. And when the indices are aggregated into a Backward World and Forward World in specification (5), both indices are significant and also of the same size.
We can therefore conclude that backward and forward integration into global and regional value chains is associated with larger wage increases for countries with low initial wages, but it is not always possible to distinguish the exact contribution of each of the four dimensions of integration (forward EU, backward EU, forward non-EU and backward non-EU). It should be noted that this does not necessarily mean that wages are converging overall in the European Union. That will depend on whether integration is general or concentrated to a group of countries. There is a possibility that integration is stronger among high-wage than low-wage countries. If so, wages may not converge but instead diverge. Furthermore, equation (13) is a conditional wage convergence modelconditional on the backward and forward integration of the member states relative to the size of the economy. The regression results suggest that wages will converge over time if all member states achieve the same level of integration over time for their respective size of the economy. However, if that is not the case wages may not converge fully.
Summary
Both the creation of the Single Market and the monetary union were designed to enhance integration and thereby promote more efficient use of resources and economic welfare, but their effects on integration has received relatively little attention by empirical research. Our paper uses tools from the global value chain, social network and wage convergence literatures to study integration of production in the European Union and how it has evolved over time. It makes both methodological and substantive contributions to the literature on European integration.
We find that integration of a member state is positively related to the size of the economy and the number of years it has been a member of the European Union. Although integration between member states increased substantially between 2000 and 2014 in terms of trade in intermediate inputs, this did not come at the expense of integration with non-members. On the contrary, integration with the rest of world increased more than integration between member states.
We also study the division of labour in the European Union. The new member states are suppliers of primary and manufactured inputs, except for Cyprus and Malta, which are exporters of services. The old member states increasingly export services instead of manufacturing inputs.
The geographical structure of the European production network can be described as consisting of hubs and spokes. Germany is the central and most important hub, while France, Italy and United Kingdom play less important roles as hubs. The centre of gravity of the production network has moved eastwards between 2000 and 2014, as could be expected following the accession of several Central and East European countries.
As a test of increasing integration, we analyse wage convergence across member states by regressing wage increases on measures of forward and backward production linkages both with other member states and with non-members. We find that wages increase faster for countries with low initial wages, which suggests that wages converge more rapidly as a result of integration.
